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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ST~-\.rrE OF lTT_.:\1-L 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
\ 
) 
YS. 
Defendant aud .. Appellant. 
Case No. 
7-±74 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATE~1ENT OF .FACTS 
Respondent agrees ·w·ith the statement of facts set 
forth in appellant's brief, but adds to the1n the follo,v-
ing facts, believed pertinent, that are not included there-
In: 
According to the uncontroverted testilnony of 11rs. 
Beverly 'Villis, the state's primary \vitness, she and her 
aunt 1net the defendant for the first time in the bar roon1 
of the I.Jahor Temple ( T. 3 and -1-) on 25th Street in 
Ogden, -,.lJtah, at about G :30 p.1n. Septernber 29 ( T. 43). 
,., 
J 
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The defendant began a .conversation 'vith 1frs. \\.,.illis 
and invited her to a table; he offered her a job at a 
hotel in Bend, Oregon, \vhere she could earn $1500.00 
per month (T. 5 and 6). C·oncerning this the following 
testi1nony was given on direct examination (T. 7): 
'' Q. Was there anything spoken in that conver-
sation between you and the defendant in thjs 
case, regarding this $1GOO.OO that he said you 
\Vould be able to 1nake j? vV as there anything 
said on how you \vould rnake it')? IIo\v n1uch 
you would n1ake an evening or ho\v n1uch 
would be involved~ · 
''A. I told hiln it seemed like an a\vful fabulous 
figure to n1e. I didn't see how a girl could 
n1ake that rnuch money in a 1nonth. IIe told 
rne when you have eight or ten 1nen in one 
night, it adds up. l-Ie said the ~J exicans are 
really free with their money, especially \vhen 
they have been drinking. I-Ie said \VhPn a 
I\Jexican has been drinking, you can take 
n1ost ·of their money away frorn then1 any-
way." 
The defendant then told l\Irs. vVillis to leave her 
aunt and meet him at 11:00 p.1n. He wrote on the cover 
of a book of rnatches the address of a ga1nbling place 
where she was to meet hin1, and he left ( T. 7). 
l\1:rs. Willis and her aunt then \Vent to the police 
station in Ogden and told two detectives of the defen-
dant's proposition; it was decided that 1frs. \Villi~ 
should meet the defendant again so that the detectives 
could get proof of the defendant's. activities and place 
hin1 in custody (T. 8). 
4 
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During tl1e ·second n1eeting \Vi th defendnn t · iu Room 
15 of the ,\ ... ilcox Hotel, according to the testhnony of 
~Irs. ,\ ... illis, the defendant proceeded to explain in· detail 
the administratiYe and protertive practices of '·'the 
trade'' ( T. 11). He told her about clothes he 'vas going 
to buy her, places he \vould take her and about other 
'vo1nen · he had \vorking · for hin1 ( T. 13). After about 
t\vo hours of conversation the t'vo detectives entered 
and arrested the defendant (T. 14). 
STATE~fENT OF POINTS 
1. The crin1e of pandering as· defined by the second 
clause of the Utah statute is n1ade out without proof 
that the fen1ale actually became a prostitute. 
2. The general remarks of the court concerning 
the materiality of evidence of previous unchastity \vere 
proper. 
3. The court's general remark that Albert Gentile 
had already corroborated the other witnesses was proper. 
4. Pronouncing of a sentence other than that pro-
vided in the penal code for a given cri1ne is not rever-
sible error. 
ARGU~fENT 
' J ' .' : ~ ;' 
-I. i.i ' 
TI-IE CRilVIE 0~ PANDERING AS D~FlNED BY THE 
SECOND CLAUSE OF THE UTAH STATUTE IS MADE 
OUT WITHOUT PROOF THAT TI-IE FEl\IALE ACTU.t\.L·LY 
BECAME A PROSTITUTE. 
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· ·· The ·argument under this ·point is intended to ·ans\ver 
appellant's points 1, 3, 5 and 6, for if it is not necessary 
that the state prove any more than that the accused 
had conversations with the female, trying to induce her 
to become a ~prostitute, then it was proper for the lower 
court to use the words ''to try to induce * * * '' in its 
instruction, overrule defenda.nt 's 1notion to disrniss on 
grounds of insufficient evidence, refuse to give requested 
instructions requiring proof of actual prostitution as 
result of the conversation, and refuse defendant's motion 
for a new trial on the ground that the facts proved did 
not constitute a public offense. 
App·ellant in his brief quotes only the first t'vo 
clauses of Section 103-51-8, Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
and cites four cases to sustain his views that it is nec-
essary to sho\v that the defendant's solicitations and 
inducements brought about a changed condition, or that 
the \voman actually be·came a prostitute. The \vhole of 
Section 103-51-8, Utah Code Annotated 1943, divided 
into seven clauses for the purpose of conveniently refer-
ring to them, is as follows: 
( 1) Any person vvho procures a fen1ale 
inrnate for a house of prostitution; 
(2) Or induces, persuades, encourages, in-
veigles or entices a female person· to becorne a 
prostitute; 
( 3) 0-r who· by promises, threats, violence, 
or by any device or schen1e, causes, induce .. ~, 
·persuades, encourages, takes, vlaces, harbors, 
inveigles or entices a fe1nale person to beco1ne 
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an. in1nate: of a house· of prostitution or. U8Signa--
tion plaet\ or any place \\'here pro~-titutipn is 
practiced, encouraged or allo\Yed; 
( -!) ... -\.nd any per~on "·ho by pro1nises, 
threats or Yiolence, or by any device or sehelllP, 
causes, induces, persuades, encourag·es, inveigles 
or entices an in1na te of a house of prosti tu ti on 
or place of assignation to re1nain therein as sueh 
inmate; 
( j) .... -\.nd any person \Vho by pro1nises, 
threats, violence, or by any device or sche1ne, 
or by fraud or artifice, or hy duress of person 
or goods, or by abuse of any position of confi-
dence or authority, or having legal charge, takes, 
places, harbors, inveigles, entices, persuades, en-
courages or procures any female 'Persori to enter 
any place within this state in vvhich prostitution 
is practiced, encouraged or allowed, for the pur-
pose of prostitution, or, not being her husband, 
for the purpose of sexual intercourse, or to in-
veigle, entice, persuade, encourage or procure 
any female person to come into this state or to 
leave this state for the purpose of prostitution, 
or, not being her husband, for the purpose of 
sexual intercourse; 
(6) And any person \vho takes or detains 
a female vvith the intent to compel her by force, 
threats, menace or du1·ess to marry hin1 or to 
marry any other person or to be defiled, or upon 
the pretense of marriage takes or detains a female 
person for the purpose of sexual inter~o.urse; 
(7) Or receives or gives, or agrees to re-
ceive ·or give, any money or thing of value for 
procuring or atten1pting to procure any fe1nale 
.. person to beco1ne a prostitute or to con1e into this 
state or ·leave this state for .the purpose of pro-
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.sti tutioii," or, not being her husband, for the pur-
pose of sexual intercourse; 
Is guilty of pandering, and shall be punished 
by im~prisonment in the state prjson for a ternt 
of not more than tvventy yeal·s. 
It will be noted that this statute covers a "multi-
tude of sins.'' 'l'o '·procure'' a fe1nale for a house of 
prostitution is an offense under the statute. ~l"'o "in-
duce" a female to becorne a prostitute is another offense. 
To ''induce'' a female by ''promises'' to become an 
inmate of a house of prostitution is an ofiense, or to 
''induce'' by '' prornises'' any fen1ale to remain in a 
house of prostitution is a public offense. Certainly 
there is no requiren1ent for change of condition there 
\vith respect to the fe1nale's status as a prostitute. If 
she is already a prostitute she can't "beco1ne" one, 
yet the statute prohibits and makes an offense the 
inducement of a female to re1nain in a house of prostitu-
tion. To receive, give, or even to agree ''to receive or 
give any 1noney'' for ''procuring or .attentp,ting to pro-
cure any female" to becon1e a prostitute is an offense. 
(Italics added). There is no requiren1ent that the fe1nale 
actually prostitute herself. A mere agreeJnent to give or 
receive money, for a n1ere a.tte1n:p1ting to procure is suffi-
cient. 
Respondent contends that the intent of the legis-
lature in adopting this statute was not only to prevent 
prostitution, but to punish those who atte1npt to foster 
it. vVith that thought in mind, it is easy o see a definite 
distinction between the first two clauses of the statute. 
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... -\.. suceess.lul Pl'Oseention. under the first clause, ''any 
person \Vho procu1'es a fe1nale in1nate for a house of 
prostitution" would require proof of the fe1nale 's actu-
ally becoming an inmate·; but under the· s·econd clause, 
··or induces, persuades, encourages, inveigles or entices 
a fe1nale per~ on to: becon1e a pTos ti tute '.' a successful 
prosecution 1nay be had \Yithout proof of the female·'s 
actually beco1ning a prostitute. The first clause strikes 
at the actual procuring, or placing of the female. The 
second clause strikes at the ·preliininary act of trying to 
procure the fen1ale or cause the fen1ale to beco1ne a 
prostitute. This difference in the 1neaning ·of the two 
clauses "~as clearly intended else 'vhy '\Vere they set out 
separately as grounds for prosecution~· It must be noted 
that the prosecuting officer was careful to charge de-
fendant under the second clause of the section. 
In disposing of the cases cited and quoted by appel-
lant on pages 6 through 8 of his brief, respondent con-
tends that none of them is in p·oint. The Idaho case, 
State vs. J.llantes, 32 Idaho 724, 187 P. 268, turns on the 
defense of entrapment, "\Vhich defense hasn't been raised 
in this case. The Oklahoma case, Jefferson v. St~ate, 21 
Okla. Cr. 388, 208 P. 1038, involves a statute sornewhat 
different fro1n ours. It contains no provision such as 
clause 2 of our statute under '\vhich defendant was 
charged. In People v .. Cook, 96. l\fich. 368,. 55 N.vV. 980, 
:the· females involved. were already prostitutes, :and the 
court in effect held that the statute '\Vas not :directed 
against the solicitation of a fe1nale, vvho was ·already 
in a house of ill f:a1ne, to go into another house. of like 
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character. · This:' ,case .thet€fore :lu:ts ·no. beating: an. the 
princi~pal case 1n which 1Ir~. \'Villis \vas not .already a 
prostitute. 
~ ' . ! i f {i •; .' ' • • ·' ! . ' . . ; . f'·. . . 1~he cour~ should find no difficulty i~ distinguishing 
f:1t.dte :v.: ~Popharn, 5~) Utah 38, 123 ·r). 888, cited. and 
,-', 1... . . .. I . r ' . . . ; 9 • I ' ·: i ("<" ; .• " -} , . . (r . - - . t 
quoted by"'appellant, fronl the' facts of tlutprincipal cas~-.-
There the. defendant' was accused under clause 4 \vhich 
requires '' pro1nises, threats or violence,'' or the use 
of a ''device or sche1ne'' to induce a fernale to rernain 
in a house of prostitution. In reversing the judg1nent of 
conviction, ;<the: court held, first, that the inforn1ation 
was not ·specific .as to the promises n1ade, or the schernes 
or ·devices used, seeond, that the evidence as to the 
promises_ was insufficient, and third, that there ·was no 
evidence; at all to the effect that the defendant asked 
the fe1nale to remain as an in1n~te of the house of 
prostitution. In the principal case defendant \Vas charged 
under clause 2, an entirely different offense; and, fur-
therwor:e, there has b-een no attack on the sufficiency of 
the.infor:rnation. 
It ·is. respondent's contention that the purpose t:>f 
the statute un·der which defendant was charged is to 
~ti~ike a"t ·'the activities of panderers and pimps in trying 
. :· ' " ' ·.' ' ~ J ! -. ' ' . : • ' 
t.o, get. fe1nale~s to ply the trade of prostitution. There 
ajre· othe-r ,s-tatutes which oStril\:e, :at :the e-vilsf!e>f illicit 
~:(~xua1': intetconrse, · 10:3-5i:..:3 {adl1ltery}. ·. -andl.B103-51-5 
(fori1ic~ti6~); (Jr operating a hoi1se of' prostithtiou, 103-
. , ' '. ! ,. } ' I '/ JJ ' , ' ~ ., ;.-.~ ~ .. ' f> ' \ ' '. : I • 
5172~-,. or ::;:profiting ,hy_ ea;rp~~gf~\ qf Ja~Ien \VCHl~en, 10B-
5il-::10, etc. So .that ,-it ;see1ns the er,in1e · of incJucing a 
10 
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fe1nale to becon1e _a pr.o_s.titute is:n~aqe out 'vithout J~ay~ng_ 
to prove these other things. 
In People rs. Snyder, 36 Cal. App. 2d 528, 9·7 P. 2<1 
97() t1940), ~ne count involved a fe1nale taken by the 
defenq.a~t to __ ~ .ho.us~, of p:r;ostituti~n, but who neve~ "rent 
,' . .· . . ' . - . - ' ' ; - \).: . '' 1 ' 
to \Vork .~her~ as .a ·prostitute because of.th~ res"Qlts of a 
•• ~- 4 ' ' j • ; '4 '. . 
clinical examination. The court held that ''the fact she 
\-
did not 'vork m such house as a prostitute. in no ~vay 
lessened the culpability of the appellant .. '', 
In Sanders v. State (1910), 60 Tex. Crirn. 34, 129 
S.vV. 605, there was involved a statute similar to clause 
2 of the Utah statute. In answering appellant's con..l 
tention that the information should have given the na1ne 
of the hotel to which the females had been taken and 
the names of the men with whom she had sexual inter .. 
course, the court said : 
''It will be noted that it i~ not the participa-
tion in the immoral conduct or the unlawful sexual 
intercourse that is condenlned under this art{cle, 
but it is the soliciting, procuring or ·alluring 'a 
female to visit or be at a particular house ·or 
room or place for that purpose:, and, since the 
statute is not punishing for the. unlawful sexual 
intercourse or . immoral conduct,. it b~con1es. n~­
necessary to set out the nan1e of the man or ·1nen 
whom the fen1ale is expected to meet. The whole 
JI'Hiu Dffense istthe, alluring o:i?1the party<to go 'to cer~-" 
.~~ -l ,-: . ; 1 tain .. places-.~ for .sexual.· in terc9urse and i1nn1oral 
):CU .. co:qd"tJ~t. .They may never _reaeh the. point de~ig~ 
nated. I£ the fen1ale is allured or invited. and :-:~) i she. starts ~-·to the place or' 1'00111 of assignatio!i, 
it .\would 1r1ake the offense co1r1·plete. lienee: ·it :is 
1 l 
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~ .;_· .:· ;" .. ·.not neGessary- to ~;et .uut tlie nni11es oi' .the parties 
whom she \Vas go_ing to n1e~t ~ *. =xc'' 
This case was cited and quoted in the similar case 
or IJa.y v: White (1944), 70 Ga. App. 819, 29 S.E. 2d 
659. 
In the case of Den1nan v. State (1915), 77 Tex. Cr. 
395, 179 S.W. 120, the defendant, a bellhop, solicited a 
feinale to accept "dates." l-Ie n1ade such "dates" and 
she visited the rooms of certain men and had illicit 
sexual intercourse with them. Appellant contended that 
the female's testirnony had to be corroborated, but the 
court In holding other'\vise made the follo,ving distine-
tion: 
''If an act of intercourse '\Vas essential to 
. a co!npletion of the offense, it l11ight vvell be 
contended that, even under such circu1nstances 
she vvould be such a party to the crinu~ as to 
require that her testi1nony be corroborated before 
a' conviction was authorized. But the statute 
1nakes it an offense to solicit and procure; even 
though an act of intercourse should not occur~ 
if intervening eauses should prevent the sexual 
intercourse. li.,or, if appellant should solicit a 
woman to go \Vi th hin1 to any place to 111eet a 
rnah for the purpose of engaging in earnal inter-
course, he would he guilty even though the wo1nan 
refused, and the fact that she con::.ents (locH not 
n1ake her an a.ccon1plice, for his ofl'ense \Vas eoul-
plete when he 1nade his solicitation. The code 
provides (Article 498) it shall Le unla\vful to 
invite, solicit, procure, or use any Ineans for the 
purpose· 'of· alluring or p1·oeuring rtn~r fe1nale :o 
r Illeet: a '!nan for the pnt]_)OSC 'of ]HlVin;·~· ::p:~unl 
intercourse \vith hiut. q · 
12 
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It app_ears that this court has not yet decided a 
case based upon the specific charge that the defendant 
induced, persuaded, encouraged, inveigled and enticed 
a female person to become a prostitute. Respondent 
therefore subrnits that the above authorities from other 
states are persuasive and should be follovved. 
Concerning the appellant's Assignn1ent of Error 
No. 1 that the trial judge erroneously inserted the vvords 
"to try" in his instruction, ~ .. espondent submits that such 
\Yas not error because it correctly stated the lavv even 
though not in the exact language of the statute. 1 
Randall's Instructions to Juries, p. 672, section 365, 
has the following to say about defining offenses: 
"In a criminal·prosecution it is not ilnproper 
for the court to define the crime charged in the 
exact words of the statutory definition of it, and 
it is perhaps better that the court should do so; 
and it is no objection to quoting the statute that 
there is no evidence that the defendant has made 
use of all the means designated in the statute of 
committing the crime charged; but it is not neces-
sary for the court to use the vvords of the statute 
in defining the offense, so long as the language 
which it does use has the sarne n1eaning and can-
not be misconstrued by the jury.'' 
II. 
TilE GENERAL REMARKS OF TRE COURT CONCERN-
ING THE MATERIALITY OF EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS 
UNCHASTITY WERE PROPER. 
13 
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:~':'As part of defenda'nt's case Ernest- ICetchum ,testi~. 
fied to a previous act of illicit sexual.intercourse on the 
part of Mrs. Beverly Willis. After the state's cross-· 
examination the court asked the witness some questions~ · 
Appellant's attorney then addressed the court on some 
1natter concerning the cle~ring of the reco.rd and the 
' ·. . ' _:_ ~·· · ...... 
cou.rt, interposing, made the follo\ving general remark: 
"First, I don't kno"\v \vhy ~!r. Browning let 
this in, but it's immaterial. Nothing has been 
shown that it'-s material.'' 
Appellant contends that these remarks were pre-
judicial error in that they tended to rna terially influence 
the jury; and that they invaded the province of the jury 
as the exclusive triers of the facts. \V e fail to see where 
the judge's remarks in any way indicated his opinion 
as to the truth of the facts testified to, as to the credi-
bility of .the witness, or as to the \veight of the evidence. 
H~.-rr,:tei'ely, of his own motion, stated the law with regard 
to . the· .m~teriality of the evidence, \vhich is certainly 
within the province and duty of the court. Concerning 
the court's duty in this respect, 2 Jones' Comn1entaries 
on Evidence (2nd Ed.), p. 1363, section 730, says : 
"It is a familiar rule \vhich n1ay be in1plied 
from all the authorities, that if the evidence pro-
, ·l·J .,, ,_ , :posed. is, clearly irrelevant it should be rejected. 
•J L .... ; .l ,And 1t1le _?judge iua'y (\reject such evidence. on his 
"' ·· o\vn· Inotion;· vvhether objected to or not >A•: * ""· r.rhe 
, evidence i may be withdra\vn by the party \vho 
has. given it, o~ the court 1nay v\·ithdra\v it,, and 
. \ ;_ .. :-!·: pol3itively in,s~ruct the j-qry .to disregard it-to 
discard it fron1 their vie\v '!.• ==<• * '' 
14 
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The· judge would have been perfectly proper in, later 
instructing the jury to disregard this testilnony, and 
that he did not do so is, of course, no disadvantage to 
the appellant. 
Appellant makes no argument on the question of 
1nateriality of evidence concerning }frs. \Villis' previous 
unchastity, and for that reason 've refrain fron1 arguing 
at length that previous unchastity of the fe1nale is not 
a defense to the crin1e of pandering. Suffice it to say 
that under our statute it is in1material whether the 
female is of previous chaste character or not. Clause 4 
of the statute anticipates the previous prostitution of 
the female, and the statute is directed against solicitation 
or encourage1nent to continue to ply the trade of prosti-
tution. 
III. 
THE COURT'S GENERAL REiv.IARK THAT ALBERT 
GENTILE HAD ALREADY CORROBORATED THE OTIIER 
WITNESSES WAS PROPER. 
In ans'\ver to ap~pellant's charge that the court mate-
rially influenced the jury by stating during the cross-
examination of one of appellant's witnesses that he had 
already corroborated the state's witnesses, respondent 
submits that the statement was made n1erely to prevent 
accumulative evidence against the defendant. It '\Vas 
n1ade prin1arily as a legal ruling on the propriety of 
further cross-examination. Unlike the case of State v. 
Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 P. 987, cited by appellant, no 
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·r~eference -was··tnade by--the-court to :any._ -facts which 
had been .the subject of the testimony. In the following 
quotation from 64 C.J., Trial, 102( 4), p. 98, a distinction 
is made between comments reflecting the court's opinion 
as to the wejght or sufficiency of the evidence and casual 
remarks not directed to th,e jury but rather concerning 
the scope of the cross-examination: 
''It is improper for the judge presiding at 
a trial to indicate, by any cornmen t or ren1ark 
rnade in the presence and hearing of the .jury, 
his opinion as to the weight or sufficiency of any 
evidence in the case, or as to what has or has not 
been established, or the extent of the dan1ages 
for which recovery is sought, or to state that 
particular facts have been proved, vvhere they 
are in dis-pute, or that there is no evidence in 
support of a contention, 'vhere evidence has in 
fact been introduced. Casual remarks, however, 
as to evidence, not calculated to have the effect 
of ilnpressing the jury with the court's vie'v of 
its weight or sufficiency, are ordinarily not fatal, 
even though they relate to whether a case has 
been made out or a prima facie showing r.oade, or 
'vhether particular evidence would \Varrant sub-
mitting an issue to the jury or support a finding: 
and- mere rulings on rnotions or objections which 
turn upon the question vvhether there is any proof, 
or sufficient proof, in the case do not constitute 
an improper intirnation to the jnry of the court'~ 
· 6pil1iotr a~r to the ·w·eight orr sufficiency of the eYi-
dence. ..A._ cornnient r--eferring to-. a disputed fact· 
ih hypothetical tern1s, ot in a n1anrier definitely 
indicating that the jndge· has no opinion on the 
··question, is' not' objectionable as a con1n1ent on 
the "ieight :or sufficiency ·of the· evjdenre. A 
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re1nark that 'GO\lnsel have gone beyond. the scope 
of -l(?gitin1ate exa1nination or eross-exe:unination 
of "'"itnesses is not iinproper as a conunent on the 
testimony elicited.'' 
rr·. 
PRONOUNCING OF A SENTENCE OTHER THAN 
THAT PROVIDED IN THE PEN.AL CODE FOR A GIVEN 
CRil\'IE IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
By section 103-51-8, Utah Code Annotated 1943, the 
crime of ·pandering is made to carry a sentence of "iln-
prisonment in the state prison for a ter1n of not 1nore 
than t\venty years.'' For son1e reason \vhich does not 
appear from the record, the court below pronounced a 
sentence of ''not less than twenty years'' in the state 
prison. 
Disregarding the propriety of such a sentence, we 
believe that this error does not affect the validity 'Of the 
sentence. The framers of the Indeterminate Sentence 
Law foresaw that there might be errors in applying the 
new type of punishment contemplated under that law. 
In 105-36-20, Utah Code Annotated 1943, the legislature 
enacted a provision which operates to correct erroneous 
sentences: 
'' ~· * * Every. such sentence, regardless of 
its form or 'vhether it, by its ter1ns, purports to 
be for a shorter or different period of time, shall, 
nevertheless, be construed and held to he a sen-
tence for the term bet"\veen the rninimum and 
n1axin1nm periods of tin1e pi·ovided by la'v for 
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-~-: · .~:.~~:_.,the· p:atticular- ctime of \Vhich the per.son.···is~·eon .. · 
victed, .:a11d .shall cont~nu~ in full force ,and- effect 
until the maxirnurn period has been reached, 
unless sooner ter1ninatecl or commuted as pro-
. vided by law. ' ' 
' ~ . 
'rhus, in every case the punishment for \vhich is 
left · indete~rniiiate: the person charged with execrltion 
of the sentence may look to the statute to asc.ertain the 
sentence imposed. Only in the cases of treason and n1ur-
der does the trial judge have discretion to irnpose a 
definite sentence; in the other cases the statute deprives 
hin1 of power to pronounce a sentence other than the 
one provided by law. 
Lee Lim v. Davis, 75 Utah 245, 284 P. 323, does not 
require· a holding that the sentence is void. In that case 
the defendant had been convicted of second degree n1ur-
der and then sentenced to an indeterminate term. Inas-
much as the statute required the trial court to exercise 
its discretion in such cases and f1X a definite ter1n, it 
\Vas held that the imposition of an indeterminate tern1 
was void. But that is not the ·case here. There the error 
\vas in refusing to exercise a discretion the court was 
duty bound to exercise, and in imposing a sentence that 
was \vholly unauthorized. Here the court pronounced 
the \vrong sentence, but of the type that is auto1natically 
corr~cted by operation of 105-36-20, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943. 
·But even if 1 there were error which requires the 
pronouncement· of. a .different sentence, the case need 
not be sent back for that ·purpose. This court n1ay '' re-
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vel'se, affirn1 or 1:nodify the jndg1uent ot~ order appealed 
froin * • *. ·' 105-43-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
In People v. Rossi, ~37 Cal. App. 778, 17 ± J>. 91(), ei ted 
by appellant, the l";alifornia Court of Appeal refused to 
ren1and the case in order to have the trial court in1pose 
the correct sentence. It \Yas there held that the sentence 
could be reforn1ed by the appellate court to confor1n to 
the injunction of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
.... \. revie'v of the law' and authorities pertaining to 
the admission of evidence, comments by the court and 
elen1ents of the crime of pandering, and a review of the 
record reveals that the appellant was granted a fair, 
legal trial, that prejudicial errors did not occur; that 
there was sufficient competent evidence to go to the 
jury and that the jury was properly instructed in ac-
cordance with law and justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CI~INTON D. 'TERNON, 
.l\_ttorney General 
RO·BERT S. RICHARDS, 
Assistant Attorney General 
BRYCE E. ROE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Res-pondent 
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